The Problem of Evil

Events like the Holocaust during World War II present a very real problem for theists that must be taken seriously. The brutal demonstration of evil’s existence cannot be explained with a series of trite responses. For example, God can do whatever He wants. In reality, God cannot do certain things. He cannot do anything that is a logical contradiction, such as making a square circle or a married bachelor. Neither can He do anything that is contrary to His own moral character. He cannot break a promise, lie, cheat or steal. To assume God wanted millions of His chosen people to die during the Holocaust clearly runs contrary to the moral character of a God who is Love.

The world must have evil in order to have good, is another inadequate response. This answer mistakenly understands good and evil as relational properties, when in fact they are absolute properties. Relational properties depend upon the existence of the other for their existence. Without “tall,” for example, there can be no “short.” Absolute properties, however, exist independent of the existence of anything else. Just as light could exist without any darkness, good could most certainly exist without any evil. Finally, one should never respond to the problem of evil with, All suffering is punishment from God. One would be hard-pressed to discover even one of the many terrible sins Jewish newborns must have committed to be punished via execution during the Holocaust.

So, how can the existence of God be compatible with the undeserved and/or unnecessary suffering of a sentient being (i.e. evil)? This question is best understood as primarily a logical argument from moral evil. The argument is built upon the following premises:

1) An omnipotent God would be able to eliminate evil.

2) An omniscient God would know how to eliminate evil.

3) An omnibenevolent God would want to eliminate evil.

We know, however, that evil exists, which presents three possible conclusions: First, one of the three premises is incorrect. Eliminating the first premise would make God unable to stop the Nazi regime. Eliminating the second would make Him unaware of the Nazis and/or how to stop them. Eliminating the third premise would mean He was unwilling to intervene to stop the mass genocide because He didn’t care. Each of these stands in stark contrast to the God of the Bible. The second possible conclusion is that evil does not really exist. While this would certainly reconcile the premises with the conclusion of God’s existence, it would demand gross negligence of the many atrocities happening throughout our world today. The atheist, then, adopts the only remaining conclusion: God does not exist.

In his book, God, Freedom & Evil, Alvin Plantiga argues that God’s existence is not logically incompatible with evil. Plantiga’s Free Will Defense doesn’t provide actual reasons for God’s allowance of evil; rather, he provides possible reasons—what they might be. According to Plantiga, if proposition p appears to be logically inconsistent with proposition q, then a reconciliation of these propositions depends upon finding some proposition r that makes both propositions p and q logically compatible. This proposition r doesn’t have to be true—only possible—to defeat logical incompatibility. Let the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God be proposition p. Let the existence of evil be proposition q. According to Plantiga, proposition r is the free will of man.

It has been established that God cannot do anything that is a logical contradiction. Therefore, even God cannot create free moral agents who are unable to do wrong. Free will and predetermined good are mutually exclusive. So, why did God choose to create man as a free moral agent rather than a pre-programmed agent of good? Logically speaking, a world with moral good is better than a world without moral good. Only free moral agents, however, can do moral good. It’s a classic case of “taking the bad with the good.” Moral good cannot be realized apart from the possibility of moral evil because genuine moral freedom always entails the possibility of going wrong. God did not make the evil performed by the Nazis, but He did make it possible.

So, why not exchange a bit more free will for a bit less evil? After all, restricting some of the Nazi’s freedom would certainly have kept the evil of the Holocaust from happening. One must ask, then, how much free will should be allowed? Decreasing free will only creates a new lowest kind of evil. For example, God could remove evil after evil until a simple papercut is the worst evil in the world. At this point, one can still ask the question, “How can a good God exist if He allows papercuts?” This is an incoherent argument that serves only to convolute the validity of the Free Will Defense.

Anyone denying God’s existence due to the evils of the Holocaust must ask himself one question: If God does not exist, then why does the Holocaust—or evil in general—bother me? If there is no God, then there is no objective standard of morality. Evil becomes impossible to even define, let alone detest. Apart from God, “evil” must be considered nothing more than being on the wrong end of natural selection where the strong survive and the weak die. Sadly, Hitler actually used this Darwinian reasoning to justify the Nazi’s atrocious acts of gratuitous evil. We know, however, that the Holocaust was indeed evil. For this reason, we know that a good God exists.